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The Public Trust Doctrine, Property, and Society
Erin Ryan

Abstract
The public trust doctrine creates a set of sovereign rights and responsibilities with regard to
certain resource commons, obligating the state to manage them in trust for the public. In the
last century, the doctrine has gradually transformed from an affirmation of sovereign authority
over trust resources to a recognition of sovereign responsibility to protect them for present and
future generations. Especially in the United States, it has evolved through common,
constititional, and statutory law to protect a broader variety of resources and associated values,
including ecological, recreational, and scenic values. Today, the doctrine is frequently invoked
in natural resource conflicts, some defending environmental regulations against constitutional
takings claims, and some of which push the boundaries of previously recognized trust values,
such as recent appeals to public trust principles in support of meaningful climate governance.
After reviewing the origins of the public trust in early Roman and English law, this chapter
explores its development in US law to protect different values, applied to different resources,
and vindicated by different legal mechanisms in different states. It reviews the two most
famous American public trust cases over a hundred year span, the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1892
decision in Illinois Central Railroad v Illinois and the California Supreme Court’s 1983 Audubon
Society decision at Mono Lake, and then explores the incorporation of the doctrine in different
state constitutions. It considers the expanding role of the doctrine as a defence to
constitutional takings claims and considers whether it should be understood as a constraint on
all sovereign authority, including federal authority, and the significance for climate-related
public trust advocacy. It concludes with reflections on the ongoing development of public trust
principles and contrasting environmental rights internationally.
Keywords: Public trust doctrine, natural resource commons, navigable waters, submerged
lands, Justinian, Magna Carta, Forest Law, Illinois Central vs. IL, Mono Lake, Audubon Society v
Superior Court, Juliana v US, constitutional takings, environmental law, atmospheric trust,
California public trust, Pennsylvania Environmental Rights Amendment, Hawaiian constitutional
trust, climate governance, environmental rights
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Introduction
This chapter1 explores the development of public trust principles from early Roman and English
law through modern US law as a public commons approach to natural resource management.
The public trust doctrine creates a set of public rights and responsibilities with regard to certain
natural resource commons, obligating the state to manage them in trust for the public. It is
thought to be among the oldest doctrines of the common law, with roots extending as far back
as ancient Rome and early Britain, where it primarily protected public values of navigation,
fisheries, and commerce associated with waterways. Over these hundreds and even thousands
of years, the common law came to recognise that some resources, such as navigable waters,
are so critical that they cannot be owned by anyone in particular – instead, they must belong to
everyone together. To prevent private expropriation or monopolisation of these critical public
commons, the government – be it the Emperor, the King or, later, the elected executive and
legislative branches – was entrusted to manage them on behalf of the public.
In the last century, the doctrine has gradually transformed from an affirmation of sovereign
authority over these resources to a recognition of sovereign responsibility to protect them for
present and future generations. Especially in recent decades, it has evolved through US
common, constititional and statutory law to address a broader variety of natural resources and
a broader scope of public values associated with them, including ecological, recreational and
scenic values. Today, the doctrine is frequently invoked in natural resource conflicts, some
involving constitutional takings claims, and some of which push the boundaries of previously
recognised trust values, such as appeals to public trust principles in support of meaningful
climate governance. Although it has not been matched in the courts, a vigorous scholarly
debate asserts its rightful application not only to state sovereign authority, but also to federal
authority.
After reviewing the origins of the public trust in early Roman and English law, this chapter
explores its development in US law from a common law doctrine emphasising state ownership
of submerged lands to a set of principles protecting different values, applied to different
resources, and vindicated by different legal mechanisms in different states. It reviews the two
most famous American public trust cases over a hundred year span, the US Supreme Court’s
1892 decision in Illinois Central Railroad v Illinois and the California Supreme Court’s 1983
Audubon Society decision at Mono Lake, and then explores the incorporation of the doctrine in
different state constitutions. It considers the expanding role of the doctrine as a defence to
constitutional takings claims, especially against environmental and land use regulations. Finally,
it considers whether the doctrine should be understood as a constraint on all sovereign
authority, including federal authority, and the significance for climate-related public trust
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Ryan, forthcoming (2023). For a more thoroughly supported treatment of this material, please see those works.
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advocacy. It concludes with reflections on the ongoing development of public trust principles
and contrasting environmental rights internationally.

Historical origins of the public trust doctrine
Modern public trust principles, which assign state responsibility for natural resources held in
trust for the public, are most commonly associated with American law. Legal scholars have long
debated the merits and mechanics of the doctrine, but the central idea of the public trust has
roots in some of the oldest doctrines of the common law tradition. Many accounts date its
origins to early English law, and some go back to ancient Rome. Versions of the public trust
doctrine now operate in every American state and many other nations. This part of the chapter
presents the conventional historical account of the development of the modern public trust
doctrine (see Ryan 2020).
The Roman and Byzantine Empires: The Institutes of Justinian
The earliest written accounts of public trust principles date back to Byzantine Emperor Justinian
I’s codification of the previous era of Roman Common Law. In the Institutes of Justinian,
published in 533, he documented the jus publicum, a principle addressing the common
ownership of certain natural resources: ‘By the law of nature these things are the common
property to mankind – the air, running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea’
(Sandars 1869, 2.1.1). Thousands of years later, it is hard to know exactly how these principles
helped govern the Roman Empire, but this commanding early statement of public commons has
echoed through common law jurisprudence ever since, in both judicial decisions and
constitutional affirmations. Analogous principles of public commons ownership, especially
pertaining to waterways, also appear in civil law countries with legal codes that draw on ancient
Roman law, including France, Spain and other post-colonial nations with related legal systems.
Early English law: the Magna Carta, Forest Charter and common law
Some jus publicum principles were later incorporated into early English law, beginning with the
Magna Carta. In 1215, King John of England issued the Magna Carta (Great Charter), promising
his rebellious barons that he and all future sovereigns would operate within the rule of law
(Blick 2015). Widely credited as a progenitor of Western democracy and constitutional law, it
also set forth rights to speedy justice and trial by jury, and against unusual punishments, and
incorporated into English law certain principles of Roman common law, including elements of
the jus publicum. Chapter 33 required the removal of all weirs in the Thames and Medway
Rivers and ‘throughout the whole of England’ that interfered with fishing or navigation.
Negotiated among a common pool of aristocrats, the Magna Carta effectively decreed these
navigable waters a public commons for such purposes.
The Charter of the Forest, added to the Magna Carta in 1217 by King Henry III, further
protected public rights to access natural resources on certain undeveloped royal lands (Magna
Carta, ch. 12; Robinson 2020, 84–87). Re-establishing traditional rights in public commons that
3
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had been eroded by William the Conqueror, the Forest Charter promised that the King would
not interfere with commoners’ rights to graze animals, forage, plant crops, and collect lumber
on designated open lands (Langton n.d.), presenting an early affirmation of public rights in
natural resource commons that would align with later expressions of the modern public trust
doctrine.
Early English law also made reference to public trust principles in a series of cases and
authorities affirming sovereign authority over submerged tidelands, the progenitor of the later
public trust in submerged lands. For example, in 1611, the King’s Bench held that while the
beds of non-navigable waterways could be privately held, navigable waters were owned by the
sovereign for public use (Royal Fishery of the River Banne 1611 at 543).
In the United States, the doctrine made its first American appearances in key state court
decisions during the early nineteenth century and was repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme
Court by that century’s end. While these decisions created uniquely American law going
forward, they drew heavily on the historical roots of the doctrine in early Roman and British
law. Some scholars have debated the extent to which ancient legal practice does or should
provide justification for the evolution of the modern public trust doctrine (Huffman 2007, 20–
23; Frier 2019, 643). However, these arguments remain a footnote to the mainstream scholarly
account (Sax 1970; Ruhl and McGinn 2020), and American courts have referred to the English
and Roman roots of the doctrine for over two hundred years. Regardless of its origins, the
modern public trust doctrine finds its most important jurisprudential roots in the long chain of
American judicial decisions and other sources that affirm its foundational role in American law.

Evolving public trust principles in American law
The doctrine of sovereign authority over submerged lands was received in the United States
through individual states’ reception of English common law and appeared in litigation within a
few decades of the nation’s founding. The emerging doctrine established sovereign ownership
over the lands beneath navigable waterways, usually up to the mean high-water mark (the
maximum rise of the waterbody over surrounding land). In the expanding territory of the new
United States, where the shores of the sea are matched by thousands of miles of navigable
rivers and enormous freshwater lakes, the doctrine was expanded from the British focus on
coastal tidelands to navigable waterways more generally. The doctrine was first recognised by
state courts during the early 1800s and, by the end of that century, the US Supreme Court had
affirmed it several times as an underlying feature of the American common law (Shively v
Bowlby 1894 at 57).
Over the two centuries since the doctrine was received in the United States, the American
public trust doctrine gradually developed from a doctrine about sovereign authority, focusing
on the prerogatives of ownership, to one that is also about sovereign responsibility,
emphasising the sovereign’s specific obligations to the public with regard to public trust
resources. This is evident in two separate spheres of American law: (1) the ongoing
development of the common law trust, and (2) the independent development of the doctrine
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as a feature of state constitutional law. Today, there are growing points of intersections
between the public trust doctrine and federal law, some of them controversial. This part of the
chapter briefly reviews these separate realms of doctrinal evolution, beginning with the US
Supreme Court’s leading case, an early decision showcasing the traditional public trust,
advancing a century forward to a modern case demonstrating the adaptation of public trust
principles as a tool for environmental protection, and concluding with examples of the parallel
evolution of public trust principles in state constitutional law.
With power comes responsibility: Illinois Central Railroad Co. v Illinois
In 1892, the US Supreme Court made its most famous statement of the traditional American
public trust doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v Illinois (at 452), and one that is routinely
quoted in later cases:
[T]he State holds the title to the lands under the navigable waters . . . in trust for the
people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.

The language echoed previous decisions affirming the principle of state sovereign ownership of
submerged lands. Yet the theme of state ownership of trust resources is limited by the fact that
the state only holds title in trust for the public. With great power comes great responsibility.
The public trust’s doctrinal infrastructure shows that it doesn’t just protect the public nature of
these common resources; it also assigns responsibility for their protection, specifically, to the
government. Analogising to the property law construct of the legal ‘trust’, the government,
acting as trustee, is responsible for protecting the trust resource for the public benefit. With
narrow exceptions, the trustee can neither alienate the trust resource nor allow its destruction.
This means that, when it is acting as trustee, the government does not own trust resources in
the same way that it owns more ordinary public lands under its jurisdiction. Instead, it holds the
resource ‘in trust’ for the real legal owner – the public it serves. Some scholars have described
the difference as one between state ‘sovereign’ and ‘proprietary’ ownership, in which
resources held as sovereign property are subject to the trust, while those subject to proprietary
ownership may be alienated by the state on terms more like ordinary private property (Slade,
Kehoe and Stahl 1997, 6–8).
As in conventional trust relationships, the public beneficiary of the trust can hold the
government trustee accountable for failure to manage trust resources in accordance with the
trustee’s responsibilities. If the public feels that the government is failing its obligations, citizens
can enforce their rights in court. In this way, advocates have argued that the doctrine acts not
just as a grant of sovereign authority with regard to trust resources, but also as a limit on
sovereign authority with regard to the same resources, constraining what the government can
and cannot do to ensure against private expropriation and monopolisation (Brief for Law
Professors et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Granting Writ of Certiorari, Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v
McCarthy 2014, 1–2, 7).
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In Illinois Central, the Court not only affirmed sovereign authority over submerged lands, it also
clarified the nature of the sovereign’s obligations to the public as trustee of those lands – and
the facts of the case demonstrate how powerful the public trust obligation can be. In 1869, the
Illinois state legislature conveyed the better part of Chicago Harbor – the most valuable
submerged lands in all of Lake Michigan – to a private railroad company (at 438–39). After a
series of transactions in which the legislature granted the railroad rights to construct
infrastructure along the lakeshore, the legislature enacted the Lake Front Act of 1869, which
conveyed ownership rights in perpetuity to the Railroad (Kearney and Merrill 2004, 818–23,
860–77, 800–01).
Whether the legislative grant was an example of flagrant government corruption or a wellintended plan to spur economic development, the Illinois public reacted with indignation and
voted in new legislators. Responding to significant public pressure, they attempted to undo
what the previous legislators had wrought. In 1873, the legislature sought to reestablish public
control over the full Harbor by repealing the original conveyance. Ten years later, when the
railroad continued to assert ownership rights, the state sued to establish public ownership of
the lakebed, and the railroad fiercely resisted the claim.
In court, the Railroad argued that the new legislature could not repeal the Chicago Harbor
conveyance made by the prior legislature. It argued that these submerged lands were now its
private property, conveyed by the Lake Front Act, and that the state lacked authority to reclaim
property that had already passed in a fully executed conveyance. As the Railroad argued, the
state could not formally convey a thing of such value and then just take it back, as if the
conveyance had never happened.
It bears noting that in fact, the state could have just taken it back for public use, paying just
compensation, under its power of eminent domain (see United States Constitution, amend. V).
But Illinois Central staked its claim on the power of the original legislative grant and the lack of
state authority to undo it.
The state deployed public trust principles as a novel legal shield. Illinois argued that its power to
undo a fully executed conveyance was immaterial under the circumstances. Conceding that
there might have been a legal problem if there really had been a legal gift, the state argued that
in this case, there was not an actual problem because – thanks to the public trust doctrine –
there had not been any actual gift. Even if it looked as though the previous legislature had
conveyed the bed of Chicago Harbor to the Railroad, in fact, no such thing had happened. The
bed of Chicago Harbor was subject to the public trust doctrine – held by the state in trust for
the public – and therefore, as a matter of law, could not be alienated (at 453–56).
The state argued that the previous legislature lacked the power to make a gift of lands
encumbered by the public trust. Such an act would be ultra vires – literally, beyond the
authority of the state – at least without taking more heroic measures to clarify why such an
unusual conveyance was in accord with its public trust obligations. As a result, there was no
actual gift, and accordingly no harm in repealing it, and, therefore, no legal foul.
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Accepting this argument, the Supreme Court affirmed that the operation of the public trust
doctrine had prevented the legislature from ever alienating the harbor in the first place. The
Railroad had never been the owner of the submerged lands, and so its legal claims ended there.
In this way, Illinois successfully reestablished public ownership of Chicago Harbor on the
grounds that the public trust doctrine had limited the state’s ability to convey trust lands away
(see at 453, 463).
Illinois Central demonstrated that the public trust doctrine functions not only as a grant of
affirmative state authority over submerged lands, but also as a limit on state authority with
regard to the management of those lands. This is because the state is required to manage them
as trustee for the public benefit. The public, as the beneficiary of this trust relationship, is
entitled to call the state to account for errant management choices in the courts. If members of
the public believe the state has failed its obligations as trustee, they can pursue their legal claim
under the public trust doctrine in court.
The premise affirmed in Illinois Central provided critical impetus for the development of the
common law public trust in nearly all of the United States. Today, the common law public trust
doctrine offers meaningful protection of navigable waterways as public commons in nearly
every state. Over the years, as plaintiffs across the country have litigated to vindicate and
define public trust obligations, the doctrine has developed differently from one state to the
next. Some states protect different resources under the doctrine and some assign different
levels of protection to trust resources, but, at a minimum, most share the common principle of
sovereign authority over lands beneath navigable waters held, in trust, for the public.
Mono Lake
One hundred years after Illinois Central, the public trust doctrine continued to evolve. One of
the most famous public trust legal developments since then occurred in the Mono Lake case of
California, National Audubon Society v Superior Court (1983). Since Mono Lake, the doctrine has
become increasingly associated not only with the protection of such traditional trust uses as
boating, commerce, fishing and swimming, but also environmental protection. This has inspired
the application of public trust principles to other resources as well, including groundwater,
wildlife, and atmospheric resources.
The Mono Lake case arose over water conflicts between Los Angeles and the Mono Lake Basin,
the eastern watershed of Yosemite National Park, four hundred miles to the north. Potable
water has long been considered ‘wet gold’ in Los Angeles, the second most populated desert
city on Earth. Located on the southern California coast, Los Angeles is home to about ten
million people. The Los Angeles River traverses the city but has enough water to supply a
population of only a few hundred thousand. Moving water to Los Angeles has thus been a
California state priority since the turn of the last century, when groundwater supplies began to
run out (for a fully supported account, see Ryan 2015).
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Los Angeles lies in the arid bottom of the state, far from the many Sierra Nevada rivers that
furnish northern Californians with more abundant water resources. However, three enormous
aqueducts converge at the city, delivering redirected water to the large population centres in
the south. The Los Angeles Aqueduct, tapping the eastern slope of the Sierra Nevada, runs four
hundred miles north from Los Angeles all the way to Mono Lake, due east of San Francisco near
the California–Nevada state line. Forty years after this first aqueduct began tapping the Owens
Valley, Los Angeles leaders realised that the growing city needed still more water. They also
realised that there was a wealth of additional, unappropriated water in the next watershed up
from the Owens Valley, just two hundred miles to the north – the Mono Lake Basin.
Twice the size of the city of San Francisco, five times deeper than the Great Salt Lake in Utah,
and three times saltier than the Pacific Ocean, Mono Lake is part of a unique ecosystem. The
lake is home to trillions of a unique species of tiny brine shrimp, and hordes of tiny alkali flies,
which are tasty as pupae and have long been a dietary staple of the local Kuzediaka’a Paiute
community. The ecosystem is thriving, but simple: the flies and shrimp survive on the base of
the lake’s food chain, benthic algae, and virtually everything else in the ecosystem – including
the native people – survives by eating the flies and shrimp. The lake provides critical sanctuary
for enormous flocks of migratory birds over this vast desert expanse of journeys from as far
north as the Arctic to as far south as Latin America, and is home to important breeding
populations of native birds, such as California gulls.
In the 1940s, Los Angeles acquired the riparian rights and requisite permits to connect the
Mono Basin to the Aqueduct. Water began to flow south to Los Angeles and the lake gradually
began to decline. As it had for the past three million years, water in the lake continued to
evaporate off the surface, leaving dissolved salts behind. The falling lake level caused
formidable air quality problems for the region, as lakebed that had been submerged for
millennia became increasingly exposed and airborne. The decreasing amount of water in Mono
Lake also caused enormous problems for its ecosystem.
As it became increasingly clear that the Mono Basin ecosystem and community were on the
brink of collapse, a concerned group of scientists, environmentalists, landowners and other
local citizens decided to fight back. They formed the Mono Lake Committee and eventually filed
a lawsuit claiming that the state could not allow the destruction of Mono Lake, a navigable
waterway, because it would violate the public trust doctrine.
In National Audubon Society v Superior Court, the plaintiff argued that the State of California
could not allow Los Angeles to continue water exports that were destroying Mono Lake, a
navigable water held by the state in trust for the people (at 716). The plaintiffs maintained that
the water rights had been illegally granted in violation of the public trust doctrine, which
prevents the state from alienating or allowing the casual destruction of navigable waterways.
The doctrine acts as a limit on state sovereignty, they argued, and thus it must trump whatever
appropriative rights the state might try to grant in dereliction of its duty as trustee. Because the
state had an obligation to protect Mono Lake in trust for the public, the Water Board, acting for
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the state, lacked authority to permit Los Angeles to destroy it by draining it away (at 712−14,
728−29).
The California Supreme Court issued a memorable opinion that both affirmed and disappointed
the central arguments made by both sides. The prior appropriations statute does not foreclose
the common law public trust doctrine, it concluded, but neither did the public trust doctrine
determine the future of California’s massive and entrenched water works. Solomon-like, the
court announced that neither of the two sets of law at issue trumps the other, and that the
state must somehow find an accommodation between them (at 712, 727).
The Mono Lake case not only saved Mono Lake, it also established several important legal
principles, interpreting the scope of public trust protections for different values, in application
to different resources, and even the operation of the doctrine over time. The one for which this
case is most often celebrated is the recognition that the public trust doctrine protects not only
the navigation and fishing values traditionally associated with the common law doctrine but
also the ecological, scenic and recreational values at stake at Mono Lake. In addition, the
California Supreme Court articulated a duty of ongoing oversight for public trust resources,
enabling the state to re-evaluate past decisions that may later portend harm to trust resources.
Finally, Audubon Society extended the public trust doctrine to the non-navigable tributaries on
which a navigable waterway relies and affirmed that it was not extinguished by statutorily
granted water rights (at 720–28). In 2018, the California Court of Appeals applied this new
doctrine protecting non-navigable tributaries of a dependent navigable waterway against
withdrawals by water rights holders – but it extended that rationale to the new context of
groundwater management. The court affirmed that the state has the authority and obligation
under the public trust doctrine to regulate extractions of groundwater that affect public trust
uses in the Scott River (Environmental Law Foundation v State Water Resources Control Board
2018 at 399–403).
Following its role in Mono Lake and other California cases, the public trust doctrine has been
increasingly deployed in litigation as a tool for protecting environmental values associated with
waterways and other public natural resource commons, including groundwater, wildlife and
atmospheric resources. Most famously, the Mono Lake doctrine was invoked by youth plaintiffs
nationwide seeking to remedy alleged failures by federal and state governments to regulate
greenhouse gas pollution of the atmospheric commons – the air – which, they pointed out, was
one of the original trust resources identified in the Justinian jus publicum (Juliana v United
States 2016; see Ryan et al. 2018; Ryan 2019, 60–64).
Constitutionalising the public trust: Florida, Hawaii and Pennsylvania
The common law public trust doctrine continues to play an important role in the regulation of
public waterways, but the trust concept has also developed independently through state
constitutional law. Public trust principles have been incorporated into a number of US state
constitutions, even where the doctrine is also part of that state’s common law (see, for
example, Thompson 1996, 866). Some are similar to the common law doctrine affirmed in
9
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Illinois Central. For example, Florida’s Constitution recognises public ownership of navigable
waterways and protections for submerged lands (Art X, § 11):
The title to lands under navigable waters, within the boundaries of the state, which have
not been alienated, including beaches below mean high water lines, is held by the state,
by virtue of its sovereignty, in trust for all the people.

Other state constitutions broaden the scope of the trust, sometimes far beyond the Illinois
Central model. Hawaii’s declares that the state holds all of its natural resources in trust for the
public, including land, water, air, minerals, and energy sources (Art. XI, § 1):
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political subdivisions
shall conserve and protect Hawaii’s natural beauty and all natural resources, including
land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the development and
utilisation of these resources in a manner consistent with their conservation and in
furtherance of the self-sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in
trust by the State for the benefit of the people.

The Environmental Rights Amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution reveals a similarly
expansive conception, adding natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values to the body of the
state’s public trust resources (Art. I, § 27):
The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to
come. As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain
them for the benefit of all the people.

In contrast to the simple affirmation of public ownership of natural resources in Florida, the
Hawaii and Pennsylvania doctrines establish a substantive commitment to protecting the
environmental values associated with public trust resources, and they partner that
commitment with an unequivocable ethic of intergenerational equity. Like the California
Supreme Court in the Mono Lake case, the Hawaii Supreme Court has established that its public
trust doctrine is not displaced by the statutory law of private water allocation (In re Water Use
Permit Applications (Waiahole Ditch) 2000 at 445). However, it goes even further than
California common law, and far further than the traditional Illinois Central version, in holding
that all water resources – and not just navigable waterways – are protected by the doctrine.
Demonstrating the power of this substantive commitment, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
famously invoked the doctrine to overturn a state law preventing local governments from
regulating to avoid harm to waterways from hydraulic fracturing (fracking) (Robinson Township
v Commonwealth 2013).
Constitutionalised versions of the doctrine thus expand recognition for new public trust values
beyond those traditionally protected at common law. Even so, some scholars have worried that
these and other statutory versions of the doctrine may inadvertently displace the more flexible
common law versions, undermining further development of public trust principles to respond
10
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to emerging problems. They worry that this calcification could effectively freeze the public trust
doctrine in time by stifling the organic process of common law development that has thus far
enabled the doctrine to evolve with the changing needs of the community (Klass 2015, 457–59).
Indeed, some states, such as Idaho, have committed the public trust doctrine to statute
specifically to prevent the further development of the doctrine through the judicial common
law process (Idaho Code § 58-1201–1203 (Ch. 12)).

The public trust as a constraint on sovereign authority
Operating as a matter of common or constitutional law, American case law has generally
presumed that the public trust doctrine is a feature of state law (Alec L. ex rel. Loorz v McCarthy
2014 at 8; see also PPL Montana, LLC v Montana 2012 at 1235). Nevertheless, points of
intersection between the public trust doctrine and important areas of federal law have become
evident, especially its role as a background principle of law in constitutional takings analysis and
in ongoing debate over the extent to which it should operate as a constitutive constraint on
sovereign authority more generally, including federal authority.
The doctrine as a background principle in takings claims
The public trust doctrine is increasingly invoked in litigation brought under the US
Constitution’s Takings Clause (amend. V). Illinois Central effectively enshrined the public trust
doctrine among what contemporary takings jurisprudence refers to as the ‘background
principles’ of state common law, or those built-in legal norms that constrain owners’ legitimate
expectations about the suitable uses of different kinds of property (see, for example, Echeverria
2012, 931–34). This intersection between the public trust doctrine and federal constitutional
law drew increasing recognition after the 1990s, when the Supreme Court issued a series of
decisions that strengthened takings claims against regulations limiting property development,
especially environmental laws.
In Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council (1992 at 1027–30), the Court clarified that regulations
constitute takings whenever they obstruct all economically viable use of private property, no
matter what public interests are at stake. It was an important moment in the evolution of the
Court’s takings jurisprudence, because it removed these conflicts from the standard regulatory
takings balancing test, by which courts normally assess the economic harm to the regulated
owner against the public harm the regulation is designed to prevent. By sidestepping the
balancing test, this new rule cleared an easier path for plaintiff owners to challenge
environmental regulations limiting the development of fragile coastal or wetland property.
However, the new Lucas rule contained an important exception: the rule does not apply if the
challenged regulation is already among the ‘background principles’ of state property law – such
as the common law of nuisance – that limit the owner’s reasonable expectations about what
they can do with their property from the start (at 1027–30).
The Supreme Court’s nineteenth-century recognition that the public trust doctrine is a
foundational element of state law thus took on new importance as its twentieth-century
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takings jurisprudence expanded liability for environmental regulations that interfere with
economic use. Today, the doctrine is increasingly invoked as a shield by state and municipal
parties defending takings claims against regulations involving construction on tidelands and
wetlands, public access to waterways, and interference with water rights. Many courts have
affirmed the doctrine as a defence to takings claims in these circumstances, including state
supreme courts in New Jersey, Hawaii, Wisconsin, South Carolina, Louisiana and Rhode Island,
and the federal Ninth Circuit. Even so, the issue is not fully settled.
The public trust as a constraint on sovereign authority
In addition, some scholars have long argued that the doctrine is better understood not as a limit
on only state sovereign authority, but as a quasi-constitutional ‘constitutive’ limit on sovereign
authority in general, including federal authority (see, for example, Blumm and Wood 2017, 43–
44; Torres and Bellinger 2014, 288). A constititutive limit is one that is built into the fabric of
sovereign authority, such that it cannot be extinguished through normal judicial or legislative
process, as are ordinary exercises of sovereign power.
State Supreme Courts in California and Hawaii, among others, have already made this
determination with regard to the role of the doctrine in state law. Pursuing the same intuition,
scholars and advocates increasingly suggest that relevant federal sovereign authority should
also be subject to public trust limits. New litigation following this line of argument has asserted
that as an inherent limit on sovereign authority, the public trust doctrine must also be an
implied feature of federal constitutional law (Juliana v United States 2020). If so, then it may
have application to waters under federal jurisdiction, and possibly to other natural resources
that can be protected only by federal authority, such as the atmospheric commons under
assault by greenhouse gas pollution (Wood 2014, 133–36).
Advocates maintain that, by the logic underlying the doctrine and the history over which it
came into effect, all sovereign authority is subject to public trust principles when it governs
resources appropriately subject to the trust. The logical argument is that there is no principled
reason to differentiate between the state or federal nature of the sovereign power rightfully
constrained by the doctrine when the sovereign acts in a manner contrary to the public interest
in trust resources. Received as part of the English common law that forms the bedrock of all
American legal institutions, the doctrine is a creature of neither state nor federal law, but a
constraint on the sovereign authority delegated to each level of government within our federal
system. Whatever sovereign possesses legal authority over critical natural resource commons
must match it with responsibility for protecting the public interests in them that have been
recognised since ancient Rome.
The historical argument asserts that the public trust doctrine must constrain federal as well as
state authority, because there are neither logical nor historical grounds to differentiate their
implicit origins. Except for the first states, the trust obligations of most American states arose
by delegation of federal authority over lands previously held in federal ownership. Today, the
doctrine most often constrains state authority because, under the equal footing doctrine of the
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US Constitution, states own the submerged lands beneath navigable waterways (art. IV, § 3, cl.
1; Pollard’s Lessee v Hagan 1845 at 222, 230), and under the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,
they are the primary regulators of tidelands within three miles of shore (43 U.S.C. §§ 1311–
1312 (2012)). But other than the original thirteen colonies, all states inherited their trust
obligations through the medium of federal sovereignty that applied before their lands were
carved out of federal holdings. The states must have inherited a pre-existing trust obligation,
goes this reasoning, because there is no clear legal moment when new trust obligations were
expressly conferred. Therefore, the doctrine must have implicitly inhered at the federal level
before it was delegated to the states, and by this theory, it remains there in application to all
trust resources that were not delegated to the states (Blumm and Schaffer 2015, 400).
Advocates thus argue that the trust simply establishes a constraint on sovereign authority at
whatever is the relevant level to protect public trust resources from private expropriation or
monopolisation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not squarely considered the issue,
leaving open to question the ultimate role of the doctrine as a limit on federal authority. To be
sure, such a finding would have to overcome formidable hurdles in other Supreme Court dicta
suggesting that there is no cognisable federal public trust (PPL Montana, LLC v Montana 2012
at 1235, noting, in dicta, that the doctrine is a feature of state law). It remains to be seen
whether this dicta will hold firm over time or be dislodged by more directed Supreme Court
litigation in the future.
The issue was most recently raised, together with other novel claims, in Juliana v United States
(2020), the ‘Kid’s Climate Case’, in which youth plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for state and
federal regulatory failures to protect the air commons from private appropriation by
greenhouse gas polluters. The federal district court judge in Oregon initially agreed that the
claim deserved its day in court, upholding the case against multiple motions to dismiss and two
writs of mandamus by then President Trump (at 1164–66; for Judge Aiken’s dramatic ruling
against the initial motion to dismiss, see Juliana v United States 2016). After an extended period
of consideration, the Ninth Circuit finally reversed the trial court and dismissed the case, over a
vigorous dissent (2020 at 1175). The plaintiffs’ appeal is now pending, but the future of their
claim remains uncertain.

Conclusion
This chapter has traced the historical development of public trust principles, showing the
evolution of the doctrine from an affirmation of sovereign authority over public natural
resource commons to a recognition of sovereign responsibility to protect them for present and
future generations. Although this chapter focuses on US law, public trust principles now appear
in legal systems throughout the world, including India, South Africa, Pakistan, Kenya, Brazil and
Canada (see Ryan, Curry and Rule 2021, Part II(D)). Variations on the idea that people hold
rights in natural resource commons also have developed in various ancient legal systems
simultaneously and independently, and in parallel ethical frameworks, such as the Rights of
Nature movement. In contrast to the anthropocentrism of the public trust doctrine, the
biocentric or ecocentric Rights of Nature movement locates environmental rights directly in the
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natural systems that would benefit from protection, rather than the people who benefit from
natural systems (Ryan, Curry and Rule 2021, Part III). Understanding the history of the public
trust doctrine and alternative frameworks for protecting rights in natural resource commons
provides an important foundation for using the law today to respond to contemporary natural
resource conflicts and – better still – prevent them in the first place.
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